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Water issues . have emerged as some of the most
intractable of contemporary policy issues, as regions around
the world try to balance rapid increases in demand with
fixed, and sometimes declining, quantities of fresh water.
California, with the eighth largest economy in the world, a
semi-and climate, and a growing population, is facing these
issues. Demand for fresh water continues to increase as sup-
ply remains relatively fixed due to the rising economic and
environmental costs of new infrastructure.' Conflicts over
water continue to intensify. This dilemma has forced water
planners to consider the reallocation of existing supplies
among competing and sometimes conflicting uses.
Surprisingly. there seems to be growing agreement
among economists, environmentalists, urban water agen-
cies and others that water markets can and should help
solve this problem. Economists have shown that market
transfers, in theory, could make water allocation more eco-
nomically efficient.2 Water would be voluntarily traded from
lower to higher economic value uses-primarily from agri-
culture to the urban sector. Environmentalists endorse the
idea because it has the potential to alleviate the need for
new, expensive, and environmentally damaging water supply
projects. Further. many believe that water transfers will pro-
vide an opportunity for environmental interests to purchase
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I..Whlle demands for water continue to increase, the traditional
response of developing new supplies is no longer a feasible option.
Several factors have contributed to this new reality. First. high proiect
costs and declining public resources have led to fevier prolects being built.
Second. environmental legislation such as the National \Vild and Scenic
Rivers Act and the Endangered Species Act have limited the number of
cost-effective sites. Third. there has been voter resistance to pay for
expensive new water projects as exemplified by the decisive relection of
the Peripheral Canal bond measure in 1982. Fourth. recent public trust
court decisions make it Increasingly difficult to construct new water pro-
lects. See. e.g.. Brian E. Gray, Tfe SFapz of Transfers to Come: A Model Water
TransferAct for Califomla. 4 WEsr-NoRmwEsT 23 (1996). PEI;L LOH & S.1os V.
GoMEz. WVATEcRTRA.sFERS IN CAurmwiFw A FRAMEWORK FOR SUSTAINA ILEIY AND
JusTICE (1996).
2. Sit generally BONNIE CoLsaf SAUBa & DAVID B. BUSH. W TER ?KR.XrS i.
THEORY AND PRAcfC Nl MAuET TRAnsrERS. WATER VALUES. AD PusuC POuCy
(1987). T. L. ANDERso.n, WATER RIGHTS: SCARcE REsouRcE ALoCAnon.
BUREAUCRACY. AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1983); BA vARE Eco:;o=r Foum (here-
inafter BAEF). UsING WATER BETTER: A MARxET-B.sED APPROACH TO
CAuFOR LKs \VIATER C ISIS (1991); RICHARD V. WAHL, WATR KE JR)ING IN
CAuFORNrLn PAsT ExPrEsiNcE. FUTURE PRospECts (1993) (Reason Foundation.
Policy Study No. 162. 1993); Charles W, Howe. Dennis R. Schurmeier. and
W. Douglas Shaw Jr.. Inno,'ale Apprc t es to Vater Allocaion: The Potential for
\VaterMarkets, 22 WTERt REsoUCEs RES. 439 (1986); H. I. Vaux Ir. and Richard
E. Howitt. Managing Water Searrity: An Eralua bn of Interregional Transfers. 20
VATER RESOURCES RES. 785 (1994).
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water for environmental uses.3 Urban water inter-
ests hope that water markets will provide new sup-
plies of water more cheaply than will building new
infrastructure.4 Some farmers view water transfers
as an opportunity to improve farm profitability. 5
Markets, however, "are not an end in and of
themselves but a means to the end of a water allo-
cation process that serves both private and public
interests."6 Despite more than 15 years of policy dis-
cussions and initiatives aimed at creating a long-
term, state-wide market for water transfers, there
has been a lack of democratic discussion over pub-
lic values in water and an excessive focus on eco-
nomic efficiency of allocation. The proposed Model
Water Transfer Act for California (Model Act)-the
latest in a series of recent proposals to reform the
state laws governing market-based water realloca-
tion and water rights in California-does little to
remedy these deficiencies. Water in California is too
important to economic prosperity, environmental
quality, and social well-being to be left entirely to
market reallocation. Water marketing reforms, as
currently proposed, are unlikely to support sustain-
ability and equity as long as large segments of the
population, especially the.poor and people of color,
are excluded from the debate.
This paper reviews the proposed Model Act
with respect to community impacts and suggests
alternative solutions. It begins by reviewing the evo-
lution of water policy in California (Section II).
Specifically, it explains why the narrow market
model usually proposed-and on which the Model
Act is premised-is not the proper institutional
foundation for water reallocation. Water is a free-
flowing and shared resource that is not easily
turned into a private commodity. Furthermore, the
market conflicts with other public goals such as pro-
tecting rural commuJnities, ensuring equity and fair-
ness, and promoting sustainability.
Then, in Section III, this paper reviews and cri-
tiques the Model Act, with a special focus on the
community and third-party impact provisions. While
the Model Act would lower some of the legal hurdles
3. NATURAL HERITAGE INSTITUTE [hereinafter NHI]. NHI
PROPOSAL ON INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS TO FACIUTATE WATER TRANSFERS
(1995); ROBERT STAVINS AND ZACH WILLEY. TRADING CONSERVATION
INVESTMENTS FOR WATER (1993); ZACH WILLEY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY IN CALIFORNIA'S WATER SYSTEM (1985);
Zach Willey, Behind Schedule and Over Budget: The Case of Markets.
Water, and Environment [hereinafter Behind Schedule and Over Budgetl.
15 HARV. 1. L. & PUB. Poi'Y 391 (1992).
4. See, e.g., METRO. WATER DIST. OF S. CAL. [hereinafter MWD].
INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN (Phase I Report, Final Draft, 1994).
5. See generally. Harold 0. Carter and Henry I. Vaux Jr., Third-
Party Effects: The Research Challenge, in SHARING SCARcrrY. GAINERS AND
LOSERS IN WATER MARKETING 44 (Harold 0. Carter, et al. eds., 1994).
See also IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DIST., WATER REOUIREMENTS AND
to water transfers, and thereby creal:e greater incen-
tives for them, it fails to adequately, protect legiti-
mate community and third-party interests.
This paper concludes that without making
water allocation fairer and more sustainable, water
markets are unlikely to be consistent with public
ends and may not develop at all. Indeed, markets
for water have yet to emerge in California despite
the fact that the state has passed more legislation
to encourage water marketing in the last decade
than any other state.7 On the othEr hand, if water
transfer policies are built on a foundation of a clear-
ly defined public interest and a fair democratic deci-
sion making process, then voluntar trades of water
could contribute to a more sustavi able and equi-
table water future for the state.
II. The Market Reform Strategy: A Historical
Context
The desire to use the market institution to
allocate water resources throughout the
West is quite appealing at first glance.
Indeed, it has been the failure to let mar-
kets price water which has led to an exag-
gerated notion of the seriousness of the
,scarcity problem in the first place
However, it is also important to look
beyond the theoretically desirable proper-
ties of a market allocation to see if, in fact,
an efficient solution will'obtair.8
ITIhe common inclination lis tol think of
Iwaterl transfers in a mode of a contract,
with two parties only-a buyer and a seller.
I believe that a more appropriate model
would be a diplomatic negotiation with a
number of parties, each with important and
legitimate interests that need to be accom-
modated, but without clearly defined rights.
The future of water transfers will be jeopar-
dized unless something like that broader
and more inclusive model is embraced. 9
AVAILABILITY STUDY (1996), and PENN LOH AND) ArNJNA STEDIrio, THE
PALO VERDE TEST LAND FALLOVING PROGRAM A MODEL FOP FUTUFlRE
CALIFORNIA WATER TRANSFERS? (1996).
6. See, e.g., NAT'L RES. COUNCIL CO,I.,% ON W WATER MGM.JT
[hereinafter NRCI, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST EFFICIENCY. EoUITy,
ENVIRONMENT (1992i.
7. See, e.g., Richard V. Wahl. Market Transfers of Water In
California, I WEST-NORTHWEST 49 (1994).
8. Victor Braler & Wade E Martin. Allocating a 'Scarce' Resource,
Water in the West; More Market-Like Incentives C2n Extend Supply, But
Constraints Demand Equitable Policies, 48 AM, 1. Ecoui. & So¢'y 268
(1989).
9. Joseph L. Sax. Understanding Transfers: Community Rights and
the Pnvatization of Water. I WEST-NORTHWEST 13 (1994),
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Water transfers are not new, and have, in fact,
been part of California's water history since 1859
when the California Supreme Court held that water
could be "transferred like other property."10 Three
years later, however, the court recognized the rights
of other water users when it ruled that the transfer
of water or water rights "must not be to the preju-
dice of the rights of others."'1 This principle of"third
party protection" remains intact today 2 and is
viewed by many as the principal limitation on trans-
fers of water in California.
More recently, Hirschleifer DeHaven, and
Milliman were among the first to promote the view
that water was not special and should be treated
like any other commodity in its allocation.' 3
Economists suggested that a market could allow
water to flow from lower value to higher value
uses. 4 By the late l'970's and early 1980's, propo-
nents of water marketing in California included the
RAND Corporation and the Governor's Commission
to Review California Water Rights Law. These pro-
ponents suggested that appropriate economic
incentives and reforms in existing water rights laws
were necessary to use water more efficiently and to
encourage voluntary transfers. 5
During the 1980's, economists, urban water
agencies, environmentalists, and business interests
began to focus on water marketing as the best way
to reallocate the state's water to urban growth and
environmental goals.1 6 Growing urban areas and
businesses believed that water markets would pro-
I0. See McDonald v. Bear River & Auburn water & Mining
Co., 13 Cal. 220 (1859).
II. See Butte T.M. v. Morgan. 19 Cal. 609 (1862). It is impor-
tant to recognize that the "rights of others' as used in this case
refers to other water rights holders and not the community or
non-water rights holders third-parties.
12. See CAL VATER CODE §§ 1702, 1706 (West 1996).
13. See JACK HIRSHLEIFER. ET AL. WATER SUPPLY: EcoNO.cs,
TECHNOLOGY AND POLICY (1960).
14. See generally Clifford Lee, The Transfer of Waler Rights in
California: Background and Issues (Governor's Comm. to Review
Water Rights Law. Staff Paper No. 5. 1977); CHARLES 1. MmTRS &
RICHARD A. POSNER. MARKET TRANSFER OF WATER RIGHTS. TOruARD AN
IMPROVED MARKET IN WATER RESOURCES (1971).
15. See generally GovERNoR's COMIsSIoN TO REviEw CALIFORNIA
WATER RIGHTS LAw. FINAL REPORT (1978): CHARLES E. PHELPS. ET AL,
EFmENT WATER USE IN CALIFORNIA: WATER RIGHTS, WATER DISRICTS
AND VATER TRANSFERS (1978).
16. See generally WILLEY. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY IN CAI.FORNI'S WATER SYSTEM. supra note 3.
See also MOHAMED EL-ASHRY AND DIANA C. GIBBONS. TROUBLED WATERS:
NEw POLICIES FOR MANAGING WATER IN THE AMERICAN WEST (1986);
MARC REISNER & SARAN BATES. OVERTAPPED OAsis: REFOR.i OR
REVOLUTION FOR WESTERN WATER (1990).
17. See, e.g.. BRENT M. HADDAD. THE ECONOMIC UNDERPINNINGS
OF EFFORTS TO CREATE WATER MARKETS IN CALIFORNIA WHY THE WELL IS
STILL DRY (forthcoming 1996); Gary D. Weatherford. State and
vide new water supplies more cheaply than building
new infrastructure. Some environmentalists sup-
ported water markets as a way to prevent the con-
struction of more dams and to encourage more effi-
cient practices and the purchase of water for
environmental purposes. Market advocates hoped
that subjecting allocation decisions to the econom-
ic calculus of the market would avoid the economic
inefficiencies generated by the political system of
allocation dominated by a few powerful interests.
In the hopes of encouraging water marketing.
reforms over the past 15 years in California have
established clearer property rights and removed
some restrictions on voluntary sales of water.17 Yet
there have been few long-term inter-regional trans-
fers and almost no market-like transfers in the
state.18 This section describes why the pure market
model is not the appropriate template for water real-
location policy. First, economic theory makes vari-
ous assumptions about well-functioning markets
that are not. and may never be. satisfied in the real
world. Simply because a resource could theoretical-
ly be allocated more efficiently does not mean that a
market will or should evolve.19 Second. the primary
objective of markets-economic efficiency--can,
and in the context of California water does, conflict
with other important social values such as fairness
in decision making, equitable access, and sustain-
ability. Economic incentives can make the attain-
ment of social goals easier and more efficient, but
first these goals must be better defined.
Federal Water Transfer Legislation. Address Before the BAEF
Environmental and Water Law Section (luly 26. 1993). In the early
1980"s. the California Legislature enacted policies that made
water transfers not simply an Incidental feature of water policy.
but vital to long-term water planning. The Legislature declared
that ... efficient use of water requires certainty in the definition
of property rights to the use of water and transferability of such
rights.' CAL WTER ConE § 109(a) ('est 1996). The Legislature
went on to say that it is 'the established policy of this state to
facilitate the voluntary transfer of water and water rights where
consistent with the public interest in the place of export and the
place of import" Id.
Other efforts designed to facilitate voluntary transfers
induded the right to transfer reclaimed water and emergency
transfers. i. §§ 1010. 1435; the right to used the unused con-
veyance capacity of public agencies. il. § 1810-14; and the cre-
atlon of a drought water bank. 1I §§ 480-82. More recent efforts
to facilitate water transfers include the Central Valley Proiect
Improvement Act of 1992. Pub. L No. 102-575. § 3401-3412. 106
Stat. 4600 (1992). and the Monterey Agreement See. e.g..
I. nL.!ErlT'AIFo oHPE Mo,*m ASR Ta- (M.Iv 1995) (Statement
of Principles by the State Water Contractors and the State of
California, Department of Water Resources for Potential
Amendments to the State ''ater Supply Contracts).
18. See LOH & GOMEz. supra note !. at 6-8.
19.S e generally Peter S. Menell. Instituibnal Fantasyfands: Frort
Sdentifc Management to Free Market Enuronmentaliam. 15 H v. l.L &
PUB. Pot:v 489 11992).
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A. Water as a Commodity: The Theoretical
Economic Underpinning
Water marketing reforms have been supported by
neoclassical economic theory. The "new resource
economists" promoted the view that natural
resources were best regulated by privatizing rights
and creating markets for their allocation.20 Other
economists were less outspoken, yet optimistic about
the possibilities of market reforms. Vaux and Howitt,
using an inter-regional trade model of water transfers
in California, determined that market transfers would
offset the need for new supplies such that only
100,000 acre-feet of new capacity would be required
by 2020.21 Such findings of potential benefits of mar-
ket allocation have bolstered reforms aimed at insti-
tuting a private property regime for water.
In an ideal water market, self-interested individ-
uals hold secure titles that can be freely sold and
transferred. When buyer and seller are given full
information of the costs, benefits, and alternatives,
trades occur only if the exchange benefits both. Thus,
water allocation is determined by decentralized deci-
sions by individuals rather than by a central regula-
tor. Distribution of water is economically efficient
because it flows to its highest economically valued
uses, thus maximizing the sum of all economic ben-
efits received. True market allocation is distinguished
from government use of economic incentives in that
prices are set by the market and not by the govern-
ment, as they are in a regulated water bank.22
According to economic theory, an efficient,
well-functioning market and its potential benefits
can only be achieved under certain conditions. 23
These include that:
1. Property rights must be clearly and
completely specified, exclusive, and
transferable.
2. The infrastructure must exist for water
to be transported from seller to buyer.
3. Buyers and sellers must be fully
informed about other buyers and sell-
ers, the water right, and the benefits and
costs of the trade and its alternatives.
4. The transfer must not impose costs on
third parties (external costs).
5 Transaction costs must be minimal.
6. Buyers and sellers must be. numerous
enough so that no one buyer or seller
can influence price.
B. Feasibility of Market Conditions in California
The above conditions rarely hold in California.
Active water markets in the Western U.S. only exist
under unique institutional and geographic condi-
tions that are not likely to be replicated broadly.24 In
most regions, there are many practical complica-
tions in establishing a water market. In California,
only some of the water rights are both quantified
and secure enough to transfer. Although appropria-
tive rights claimed before 1914 should be quanti-
fied, they are only established through adjudication
and therefore are easily shuffled around. Further,
most groundwater rights remain unquantified.
25
According to Tarlock, California's "water rights
do not function to allocate water, but as licenses to
take until the taking is contested.' 26 Clarifying a
water right and determining the potential impacts
of a transfer require expensive hydrologic studies of
return flows and interactions witl groundwater.27
Parties other than the buyer and seller, including
other water rights holders, water recreationists,
local communities and their economies, as well as
the environment, could be significantly affected if a
transfer changes the quantity or quality of water
available at a certain place and time. Uncertain
water rights, costly and uncertain information, and
impacts on parties other than buyer and seller all
raise the costs of transactions. These costs include
looking for parties with whom to trade, verifying the
legal rights and physical characteristics of the water
to be traded, negotiating price and ther terms, and
obtaining legal approval for the transaction.
28
Under these conditions, a long-term, inter-region-
al water market is likely to be small, as has been the
case so far in California. Participation is limited pri-
marily to those buyers and sellers connected to exist-
ing conveyance systems who have the resources to
20. See, eg., ANDERSON, supra note 2.
2 1. See Vaux and Howitt, supra note 2, at 789.
22. See Willey, Behind Schedule and Over Budget, supra note 3. at 403.
23. See generally HADDAD, supra note 17; Braier & Martin, supra
note 8; Zachary McCormick, Institutional Barrers to Water Marketing
in the West, 30 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 953 (1994); Robert A. Young,
Why Are There So Few Transactions Among Water Users, 68 AMER. J. AG.
EcoN,. 1143 (1986).
24. See, e.g., An M. Michelsen, Administrative, institutional, and
Structural Charactenstics of an Active Water Market. 30 WATER RES. BULL.
971 (1994).
25. Telephone interview with E. Anton, Chief, Division of
Water Rights, California State Water Resources Control Board,
(July 24. 1996).
26. A. Dan Tarlock, From Natural Scarcity to Artificial Aundance
The Legacy of California Water Law and Politics, I WEsT-NoRTHWEST 71
(1994).
27. The Model Act does not address groundwater transfers
per se, it only addresses groundwater in conjunctive use with sur-
face water transfers. As for pre-1914 surface water transfers, the
Model Act does not require SWRCB review or approval,
28. See Bonnie G. Colby. Transactions Costs and Efficiency In
Western Water Allocation, 72 AMER. I. AG, EcoN, 1184 (1990).
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pay high transactions costs. Until recently, buyers
have been dominated by one urban agency, the
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California.
More recently, other urban water agencies, including
San Diego County Water Authority and the East Bay
Municipal Utility District, have entered the market.
Potential sellers have been limited to those districts
with reliable and secure rights: the three major irnga-
tion districts using Colorado River supplies, the four
original San Joaquin River exchange contractors, and
Sacramento River water rights holders. So far, only one
individual seller has publicly entered negotiations 9
Without numerous buyers and sellers, a water market
would not be well-functioning nor efficient, and thus
potential benefits would not be realized. Many poten-
tial buyers and sellers are not individuals but Water
districts that hold water rights. These organizations
sometimes block trades, but oftendo so in order to
protect their own viability and the interests of their
members and to ensure local control? 0
Some of these barriers to markets could be
overcome, albeit at some cost. Water rights could
be more clearly defined and quantified. A simpler
administrative process could be implemented for
transfers. Formulas could be used to quantify and
to compensate for community and third-party
impacts. While the Model Act makes incremental
progress in many of these areas, many of the market
conditions listed above are unlikely to be satisfied
because they stem from water's physical character-
istics and its importance to community and individ-
ual well-being. Sax suggests that in each transfer
there are numerous parties. "each with important
and legitimate interests that need to be accommo-
dated, but without clearly defined rights."3'
C. Desirability of Market Objectives: 11s There
More Than Economic Efficiency)
A more important consideration than feasibil-
ity of markets is desirablility. Even if markets are
more efficient than other allocation institutions,
the social values promoted by a market may con-
flict with other legitimate public goals. The mar-
ket's main purpose is to- promote economically
efficient allocation; this is consistent with the val-
ues of individualism, self-sufficiency, and decen-
29. Se, eg.. I. A. Savage. The Selling of \Vater. 25 CA. . 39 (1994).
30. See Barton H. Thompson Jr.. Instituional Perspectlves on
Water Policy and Markets, 81 CAL L. REV. 671 (1993).
31. See Sax, supra note 9. at 13.
32. Id.
33. See generally. ARTHUR MAASS & RAYmOND L ANDrSON...
AND THE DESERT SHALL REIOICE: CONFLICT. GRowTm. AND JUSTICE IN ARID
ENVIRONMENTS (I978),
34. CAL Ac'no NErWoRK Ihereinafter CAN]. CA .RN A WATER
tralized economic organization. Economic efficien-
cy, however, is only a means to other social ends.
Community values, equity and fairness, and sus-
tainability are not lust barriers to markets, they are
also among the ends that allocation institutions
should help achieve.
Private water rights do not account for all the
benefits of water that accrue to the broader com-
munity. "Unlike almost every other form of proper-
ty, which we allow to be entirely privatized, water
has always been viewed as something in which the
community has a stake and which no one can fully
own. "32 Water districts in and regions serve not
simply to provide water but also to resolve con-
flicts and realize local participation and control.33
At the local level, existing water uses support the
economy, tax base, environment, and recreational
values of the communities.34 Local communities,
such as Hispanic and Native American communi-
ties in the southwest and other rural communities,
derive an important sense of cultural identity, of
place, and of security from traditional water allo-
cation systems.3 5 Even from the state perspective,
certain rural cultures and environmental values
are heritage resources that should be protected. In
fit re Application of Hoard Sleeper.36 Judge Encinas
reversed the approval by the New Mexico State
Engineer of a water right transfer from an agricul-
tural use to a ski resort. He ruled that the "unique
cultural heritage" of Northern New Mexico should
be preserved over the net economic benefits
offered by the ski development.7 According to the
court, these types of collective benefits are diffi-
cult to measure in market prices and therefore dif-
ficult to compensate for in transfers. Supporting
the values of conflict resolution, community cohe-
siveness, and cultural heritage requires some mea-
sure of public control over allocation.38
Purely economic markets are also objection-
able if the goals are equity in distribution and fair-
ness in the decision making process. Creating a
system of private rights redistributes wealth. At
the same time that rights holders gain more secure
titles to water, other individuals and the communi-
ties that have benefited from the use of water in a
particular place and manner become "third par-
MAR= Tn Poucy: TowARD AcH VING A NET BwEsNT oa ALL (1992;
CAN & CAL. Ass'n O F,.ILY FAsmtERS. S.LES c7 %IATER in CA.i , Rroe
SOmE THouoms nRo.t AsrcuuruA. cmounmEs (1992).
35. Si. e.g., . LE Bnowri & HEwz M. INGR. WATER AND
PovERT IN THE SOuTweM (1987).
36. Case No. RA-84-53(C). Rio Axeiba County. New Mexico.
First ludidal District (April 16, 1985).
37. Id.
38. Id.
Fall1996 Qmmifes ard Water),1mbts
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ties" and potentially lose their historical benefits if
water is transferred without adequate protections.
Of particular concern is the fact that transfers of
water would disproportionately harm the poor
since they have the fewest resources to adjust to
economic changes caused by the loss of water.39
The poor and people of color are also the least
likely to hold water rights and thus the least likely
to benefit directly from water sales. Economic the-
ory holds that a wide range of distributional out-
comes are possible in a market, depending on the
initial allocation of rights. It is unlikely that a mar-
ket based on the present disparities in water rights
and on the ability to adjust to economic changes
will achieve an equitable outcome. Achieving a
more equitable distribution of water is not an eco-
nomic task, nor an afterthought to establishing a
market; it is a political task that needs to be dis-
cussed before proceeding with new legislation or
policy to create a water market.
In an unregulated market system, water is
allocated according to individual decisions to buy,
sell, and use water. The public interest is defined
as the sum total of private benefits. Water plan-
ning then becomes irrelevant and private "wants,"
not public "needs," dominate.4 0 Market realloca-
tion, therefore, is not fair because water flows to
those with the most resources. The rich have more
of a "vote" in the marketplace and will determine
how water will be used. By moving water to the
highest-valued uses as measured in economic
terms, the market will distribute water according
to effective wants, not needs. Such a system will
not support widely accepted social goals such as
providing affordable access to adequate supplies
of water for meeting basic human and environ-
mental needs, or as keeping public institutions
responsive and accountable to the public. As
California's water needs change, driven by eco-
nomic and demographic changes, democratic
processes and fairness in decision making will
increase in importance. Because water is so
infused with public values, only democratic insti-
tutions that allow public debate over the common
good can ensure fairness in allocation decisions.
Finally, markets do not promo,:e the long-term
sustainability of the water resource. Markets do not
ensure that ecological integrity is maintained for
future generations. Short-term gains often out-
weigh preferences for future uses. Prices do not
reflect the full value of the services provided by
ecosystems or the intrinsic value of pristine and
undeveloped water courses. Even if water could be
purchased for the environment, this water could
not reach many of the wetlands and wildlife refuges
that are not connected to the state's water system
unless new infrastructure is built.
Water is also implicated in the sustainability
of the state as a whole. Ironically, market transfers
of water from agricultural to municipal and indus-
trial uses, while preventing new dams, could allow
for more unsustainable growth in :he state. Urban
growth patterns have been led by lend-owning and
developer interests, who have pursued new water
supplies not to meet existing needs but to facili-
tate unplanned growth and increase their own
wealth.4 This growth-oriented water ethic has
resulted in more than 110 approved or pending
developments without identified long-term reli-
able water supplies.42 Many urban water managers
still ascribe to this ethic and feel that it is their lob
to meet demands, not to control il .4
In a market, large urban water agencies have
the upper hand in negotiations in terms of informa-
tion, staff, and willingness to pay for water, Thus,
water marketing may result in more suburban
sprawl at the expense of open space, farmland, and
rural communities. According to a recent study by
the American Farmland Trust, more than one mil-
lion acres of farmland (60 percent of which is prime
farmland) will be lost to urbanization in the Central
Valley by the year 2040.44 Thompson notes that
because many urban agencies do rot use marginal
cost pricing, the water transfer option can be a way
for these agencies to avoid implementing political-
ly sensitive conservation and pricing practices that
could reduce demand at less overall cost. 45 Recent
evidence from urban water agencies-including the
Goleta Water District and the East Bay Municipal
Utility District-support this notiorl
46
39. See generally BROWN & INGRAM. supra note 35; CAN, supra
note 34; Sax, supra note 9.
40. See Victor Braler, et al., The Strengths and Weaknesses of Water
Markets as They Affect Water Scarcity and Sovereignty Interests in the West.
29 NAT. RES. 1. 489 (1989).
41. See ROBERT GOTTLIEB & MARGARET FrIZSIMMONS, THIRST FOR
GROWTH: WATER AGENCIES AS HIDDEN GOVERNMENT IN CALIFORNIA
(1991 ); Richard A. Walker & Matthew 1. Williams, Water from Power
Water Supply and Regional Growth in the Santa Clara Valley, 58 EcoN.
GEOGRAPHY 95 (1982).
42. See E. BAY MUN. UTILITY DIST., LACK OF LONG-TERM RELIABLE
WATER SUPPLIES (1995).
43. See DAVID L. FELDMAN. WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, IN
SEARCH OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIc 2 (1991),
44. AM FARMLAND TRUST, ALTERNATIVES FOR FUTURE URBAN
GROWTH IN CALIFORNIAS CENTRAL VALLEY: TE E BoTroM LINE FOR
AGRICULTURE AND TAXPAYERS (1995).
45. Thompson. supra note 30.
46. Telephone Interview with Bob Wilkinson, Lecturer,
Environmental Studies Department, University of California at
Santa Barbara (June 6, 1996),
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III. The Model Act Inadequate Protections for
Community and Third-Party Impacts
As noted above, years of policy reform efforts and
attempts to create a market for inter-regional long-
term water nghts in California have yielded few long-
term, inter-regional, market-like transfers. Today,
fresh attempts are being made to create a water mar-
ket The Model Water Transfer Act for California is the
latest proposal to reform the state laws governing the
market transfer of water and water rights in
Califormia. 47 Sponsored by the California Business
Roundtable, the California Chamber of Commerce,
the California Farm Bureau Federation, the California
Manufacturers Association, and authored by Hastings
College of the Law Professor Brian E. Gray, the Model
Act reflects the view that voluntary water transfers can
help reallocate the available water supply to the ben-
efit of all Californians.
48
While the Model Act addresses some of the
issues raised in Part'll, supra, and makes incremental
progress toward establishing a market in a number
of very important areas-including efforts to create
a set of coherent transfer rules, to protect the rights
of current water rights holders, and to reduce the
regulatory burden of water transfer review proce-
dures-it flounders in its attempts to provide ade-
quate protections for communities and third parties.
Language in the purpose and policies sections
of the Model Act proposes a "comprehensive set of
laws to govern voluntary transfers of surface water
and to protect the legitimate interests of others who may be
affected by such transfers."49 In the Declaration of
Policies, for example, the Model Act states that "Itlo
the extent that water transfers cause injury to ... the
regional economies of areas from which water is
transferred, these third-party interests must be
appropriately protected or compensated."50 While
language in these sections acknowledges that com-
munity impacts are legitimate interests that must be
47. Beginning in 1979. the California Legislature enactedasenes
of statutes designed to promote the voluntary transfer of water on a
broader regional and statewide basis. Such efforts, along with the cre-
ation of the 1991 and 1992 Drought Water Bank, reflect the view that
voluntarywater transfers can help re-allocate available supplies to the
benefit of all Californians. See supra note 17 for additional details.
48. The Model Act also reflects the recognition that water trans-
fers have yet to achieve their market potential to improve the effec-
tiveness of California's water system. It ignores the importance of
water for socal, environmental, and cultural values. It also falls to
acknowledge that water transfers, of all dassifications and durations.
produce winners and losers. And. as Ingram has noted, those individ-
uals whose interests are quashed by markets are ound to pursue
political avenues to achieve benefits and avoid costs: Helen M.
Ingram. Politiks, Markets. Soady, and Water Resour. 1 4 HAt.,on: 1. Hu.AN.
57 (1992). Therefore. understanding California's needs and changing
water politics is the only way to move market discussions forward.
49. See A MODEL wA7ER \T mN Acr FOR CsuRm Ihereinafter
MODEL AcT] § 102 (emphasis added), repned in 4 VIsr-NoRnm vsr 3
(1996).
adequately protected or compensated and seems to
imply that they are adequately protected or mitigat-
ed, there is little evidence to support this implication
in the body of the Model Act. Further, nowhere does
the Model Act address the fundamental ethical ques-
tion concerning whether water developed by the
public, through taxpayer investment and for public
benefit, should be marketed for private gain.
This section focuses on the need for more com-
prehensive community and third party protections,
and limits the discussion of other Model Act issues
accordingly. As the National Research Council con-
cluded in Water Transfers in the West: Efficiency, Equity.
and the Environment:
IRlecognition and protection of third party
interests are essential if water transfers are to
achieve their potential to reallocate water to
meet new demands. ... ITihe West has never
treated water as lust another commodity and
should not do so now. There must be a bal-
ance between efficiency and fairness.5"
The Model Act, as currently written. fails to strike
such a balance. Community and third-party protec-
tions vary depending upon the class of water being
transferred or upon the duration of the transfer, and
all protections or mitigations are grossly inadequate.
Short-term water transfers require no community or
third-party impact protection or compensation.
Protection or compensation for long-term water
transfers, which may be permanent in nature, are
also inadequate.52 Only long-term transfers involving
water from land fallowing or in retirement qualify for
community and third-party protection or mitigation
consideration.53 Expedited transfers of conserved
water, as defined by Section 505. limit review and
comment, as well as limiting potential remedies for
community and third-party impacts to the "security
deposit" of $5 per acre-foot of water transferred. 54
50. See 0. § 101.
51. NAA'h Rcs, Commi.. I WATER TRASFEL IN THE WEST:
EmrcrNcy. Ecuirr. ANDTHE Emuo:a,.r 8 (1992). This report high-
Ilghted the seriousness of community and third-party impacts
that might result from transfers of imgation water from local
areas. The report stated that "Inlo issue gave the committee more
trouble than that question of how to characterize and evaluate
the effects of water transfers on small communities.- LI. at 45.
52. See infra Part 111,8.
53. See MODEL Act Infra Part i11B.
54. See MoDE. Act. The -security deposit" must be adjusted
annually by the SWRCB based on changes in the Consumer Price
Index published by the US Department of Commerce. The liabili-
ty of both buyers and sellers is limited to this "security deposit:
and the burden of proof is on the injured party who must estab-
lish by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant's
Inluries where caused by the water transferand not other factors.
See U. § 506 (d).
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A. Short-Term Water Transfers Require No
Community or Third-Party Protections
Under current water law, short-term water
transfers are transfers of water which are one year or
less in duration. The Model Act, however, would
expand the term of short-term transfers to two years
or less for transfers between the same seller and
buyer. The Model Act allows successive two-year
transfers to different buyers.55 Thus, a seller could
conceivably enter into two-year, consecutive agree-
ments with different buyers and evade ever having
to safeguard against, or compensate the communi-
ty or other third parties for, reasonable impacts.
Thus, in an effort to create the right economic
and regulatory incentives to facilitate market-based
water reallocation and improve economic efficiency,
the Model Act has created a serious loophole for will-
ing sellers to sell their water irrespective of the
adverse community or third party impacts. According
to section 404(a), the State Water Resources Control
Board (SWRCB) must approve the transfer unless it
concludes that it "would result in significant injury to
any legal user of water" or "would unreasonably affect
fish, wildlife, or other instream beneficial uses."
56
As section 404(a) is currently written, only other
water rights holders and the environment have
standing to challenge short-term transfers. The bur-
den of proof rests on the parties that have filed
protests in accordance with section 403. 57 Short-
term transfers that meet section 404(a) require-
ments, including consecutive transfer as long as it
is not to the same buyer, must be approved regard-
less of the adverse economic or social impact on
community or other third-parties. Such short-term
transfers could be based on land fallowing or in
retirement, or be consecutive, yet not require any
protection or compensation of community or third-
party impacts. No challenge, regardless of the seri-
ousness of the economic impact, could be filed by
the community or others adversely affected.
B. Long-Term Water Transfers Require Community
or Third-Party Protections Only if Based on
Land Fallowing or Retirement
Similarly, protections or mitigation require-
ments for long-term transfers are grossly inade-
quate despite the fact that they have a greater
potential to cause irreparable harm to the commu-
nity or to third-parties. The Model Act defines long-
term water transfers as proposals or agreements to
55. See id. § 204 (If a water nght holder or water transferor
enters into successive short-term agreements with the same
party .... and if such successive agreements have commencement
dates within one year of each other and result in the transfer of
water for a term in excess of two years, the agreement shall be
regarded as a long-term agreement...".
56. See id. § 404 (emphasis added).
transfer water for more than two years and includes
the permanent changes in water rights and perma-
nent transfers of water.58 The Model Act would pro-
hibit the SWRCB from approving a long-term trans-
fer unless it concluded that the transfer "would not
result in significant injury to any legal user of water"
and "would not unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or
other instream beneficial uses."59 Once the SWRCB
concluded that the long-term transfer complied
with these requirements, and that it was not based
on water from land fallowing or in retirement, it is
required to approve the transfer, regardless of the
impacts on the community or other third parties,
Thus, like short-term transfers, this category of
long-term transfers does not require any communi-
ty or third-party protection or mitigation.
Community or third-party protection or compen-
sation is required only for long-term agreements
based on land fallowing or in retirement of previous-
ly irrigated land that "cause substantial harm to the econo-
my in the area from which the water is to be transferred,"60 It is
unclear from the Model Act what level of economic
and third-party impacts would be sufficient to consti-
tutes "substantial harm to the economy." Further, the
SWRCB is required to take into consideration any
actions that the petitioner or other parties to the
transfer agreement have taken to mitigate harm to the
economy. Conceivably, then, parties to a long-term
transfer of water from land fallowing or in retirement
that would result in "substantial harm" could circum-
vent their obligation to the community by taking min-
imal actions to mitigate such impacts. Thus, without
a clearer definition of "substantial harm" and corre-
sponding responsibilities, parties to such transfers
could easily shed their legal obligati:)ns, 61
Evidence suggests that long-term water trans-
fers, especially those from land fallowing or In
retirement, do create undue economic and social
burdens on the economies and local governments
in the areas from which water is transferred More
importantly, impacts are not limited to long-term or
permanent transfers. Even short-term or emergency
transfers have the potential to create undue eco-
nomic burdens. For example, evidence suggests
that the Drought Water Bank created substantial
impacts on the local economy, job, and social ser-
vices. In 1992, the Yolo County Boaid of Supervisors
submitted a bill for $129,305 to the Department of
Water Resources for reimbursement of the county's
additional expenditures for General Assistance and
57. See id. § 404(a).
58. See id. § 204.
59. See id. § 404 (emphasis added),
60. Id. § 404(c) (emphasis added).
61. See id. This provision does not apply to land within the
San Joaquin Valley Drainage Program study area,
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Aid to Families with Dependent Children allegedly
caused by increased unemployment attributable to
land fallowing and to the transfer of water to the
1991 Water Bank.62 While the county's claim was not
substantiated, it illustrates the legitimate concerns
held by local communities and third-parties depen-
dent on irrigated agriculture for their livelihood.
Evidence from other long-term transfers, even
those not involving substantial land fallowing or retire-
ment, suggests that impacts may be substantial. A
study of the Palo Verde lrngation District-Metropolitan
Water District two-year transfer suggests that, while it
is difficult to quantify impacts with a high degree of cer-
tainty, there were a number of community impacts.6 3
The study reveals that farm workers were adversely
affected through the loss of on-farm jobs. The selling
community experienced negative effects from the loss
of employment in farm-related industnes.64
Even non-market transfers or water delivery cut-
backs have the potential for substantial impacts on
local economies and on people that depend on water
for their livelihoods. A study of the impacts of the water
delivery cutbacks during the 1987-1992 drought on
Mendota (Fresno County), for example, concluded that:
* irrigated cropland decreased by 14
percent as a result;
" farmers substituted groundwater
because of the loss of surface water
deliveries and may have exacerbated
groundwater overdraft;
" employment and wages, as well as the
number of farms, declined substantial-
ly in the Mendota area;
" non-agricultural, related businesses
declined substantially; and
* tax revenues and property values, includ-
ing agricultural land values, declined.6f5
Thus, the premise that only long-term transfers of water
from land fallowing or retirement can result in sub-
stantial impacts on communities and other third-par-
ties is not supported by the evidence. As we have illus-
trated above, transfers of water, whether short-term or
long-term, market-based or the result of drought con-
ditions or legal mandates, can have substantial
impacts on communities and third parties. Given this
evidence, the standards and procedures for expedited
transfers of conserved water are very troublesome.
62. See. e.g.. Bnan E. Gray. The Market and the cormunitg:
Lessons from Californa's Drought Water Bank. I WES-NoRm-WEST 17
(1994).
63. See'LoH & STEDING. supra note 5.
64. Id. at 13-17.
65. See DON VIUAiRFO. 93640 AT RisK: FA.RmERs. WORKERS AND
C. Expedited Transfers: Inadequate Safeguards
and Remedies
The Model Act's expedited transfer provisions
purport to provide adequate community and third-
party protections by limiting the amount of water
that can be transferred to the transferors historic
consumptive use plus any water that is irretrievably
lost to all beneficial uses. However, we strongly dis-
agree. These limitations may provide some protec-
tions for other water rights holders, instream uses,
and groundwater recharge, but they fail to protect
the interests of communities or other third-parties
which are likely to be adversely affected. Not only
are protections inadequate as the Model Act is cur-
rently written, but a communitys (or a third-party's)
ability to challenge an expedited transfer is serious-
ly limited. As the author of the Model Act has stat-
ed, one of the central purposes of the Model Act is
to 'permit ... transfers to occur relatively quickly
and inexpensively without substantive pre-transfer
review by the State Water Resources Board and
without post hoc substantive review by the courts."6
In addition to inadequate public and judiaal
review, sections 505 and 506 limit the amount of
damages to the $5 "security deposit' per acre-foot.
Section 505 of the Model Act requires that a $5
"security deposit" per acre-foot of conserved water
transferred be placed in a community and third-
party environmental compensation and mitigation
fund managed by the SWRCB.67 Revenue from the
compensation and mitigation fund would be used
to pay for damages caused to the environment.
other water rights holders, and to the community.
Compensable community injuries are limited to
the loss of tax revenues and to the increased social
services costs. Damages to farm workers, to busi-
nesses that depend on the current uses of water,
and to others would not be compensable. Limiting
compensable damages to local governments is
inadequate given the number of other third-parties
that can be reasonably expected to be adversely
impacted by water transfers-farm workers, busi-
nesses, land owners, among others.
Others have expressed similar views, and have
suggested other mechanisms for endowing the
compensation fund and for its use.68 The Natural
Heritage Institute. for example, favors the creation
of an impact compensation fund that would recap-
ture the excess profits when and where they accrue
Towaisrp.o Iu i EPA oF WAER U:cER :,Ll (1996).
66. Gray. supra note 62. at 34.
67. MonELAcr. §§ 505. 506.
68. See Gregory A. Thomas & Tara L Mueller. Raetions on tI&
"Mel Vater Tranler Aer N the Natural Heriltae Institute. 4 WVEsr-
NoRTmwrs91 (1996).
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in water transfers.6 9 The Rural Water Impact
Network (R-WIN) has recognized the practical lim-
itation in attempting to recapture the excess prof-
its and is advancing a community mitigation pro-
posal that calls for a tiered water transfer fee
schedule based on the type of water and the
nature of the transfer.70 While R-WIN's proposal is
still evolving, it would exempt the transfer of water
conserved through efficiency, through banking of
water in wet years in excess of contract, and
through small-scale intra-regional agriculture to
agricultural transfers. The transfer of water con-
served through rational fallowing, field crops, row-
crops, and permanent crops would be subject to
increasing fees, with fees for long-term transfer
(those greater than one year) twice as high as
those for short-term transfers. 71 While such a
tiered fee structure might discourage some mar-
ginally beneficial transfers, it attempts to more
accurately correspond to the community and third-
party economic impacts of communities that los6
the water. This structure is supported by prelimi-
nary findings of the Pacific Institute.
IV. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
Efforts to create a market for water must bal-
ance the historically competing commodity and
community perspectives on water and build upon
a common understanding of the values involved
and of the necessity of communication and coop-
eration. The problem with and the conflict in
recent efforts to create water markets, including
the Model Act, is not that they acknowledge that
water has "economic" value, but that they attempt
to divorce water from its value to the community.
As F. Lee Brown has noted, "Water has value to
traditional societies ... even if it is not scarce ...
The assessment that water has become an eco-
nomic good ... does not logically or empirically
imply that prices and markets are necessary insti-
tutional prescriptions for handling the problem of
its scarcity."
72
69. Id. NHI defines excessive profits as the difference
between the cost of water (including the cost of conserving or sal-
vaging it) to the seller and the price (net of less the transaction
costs) necessary to motivate the transfer. NHI then would use the
value of that same block of water in other applications as the
proxy to determine the price necessary to motivate the transfer.
Id. While such an approach seems theoretically sound. it might
prove difficult in practice.
70. RURAL WATER IMPACT NETWORK, A PROPOSAL FOR ADDRESSING
IMPACTS FROM WATER TRANSFERS AND REALLOCATIONS IN CALIFORNIAS
AGRICULTURAL REGIONS (1996).
71. Id.
72. E Lee Brown, Water Markets and Traditional WaterValues:
Merging Commodity and Community Perspectives 5 (unpublished
This paper has argued that ecoiomic theory and
rationale alone is insufficient to crate a market for
water. Water is and has always been a shared com-
munity resource, vital to fulfilling both individual and
public values. A free market, as envisioned by the
Model Act, is not the appropriate model for water
allocation because it limits public debate in water
policy and excludes the values of community securi-
ty, equity, and sustainability. As stated previously,
community values and equity and fairness are not
mere barriers to markets, but are among the ends
that allocation institutions should help achieve.
The Model Act fails to integrate community and
social values with the efficiency goals of a market.
While it would give current water rights holders
incentives to sell their water to tha highest bidder,
and, we would argue, give them a windfall, it is
unclear how that alone would result in improved
water reliability and sustainability. We have argued
elsewhere that the Model Act might actually limit
the ability of the SWRCB and other regulatory agen-
cies charged with protecting the public interest to
uphold and more strictly enforce the "reasonable"
and "beneficial" use doctrines
73
Similarly, the Model Act fails to establish clear
qualifications for buyers and sellers We have recom-
mended elsewhere that buyers should be required to
demonstrate that they need the water, that there are
no better alternatives for supply, and that they are
conforming to certain standards of efficiency.74 While
this places an additional burden on potential buyers,
it ensures that potable water is not being used to pro-
mote wasteful water use practices at the expense of
sustainable agriculture or of basic human or environ-
mental needs. A potential means by which to set
these requirements, which the Model Act does not
include, is through a thorough and consistent inter-
pretation of the "reasonable" and "beneficial" use
doctrines. Conceivably, such limitations would not
result in more efficient, beneficial, or sustainable use
of California's water supplies. Rather, the Model Act
could simply facilitate the flow of water to those with
the greatest financial ability to pay for it.
manuscript, presented at the conference "Water. A Trigger for
Conflict/A Reason for cooperation, at the Indiana Center for Global
Change and World Peace," Indiana University, Mar. 8, 1996).
73. See LoH & Go.%iz, supra note 1, at 17 The Act would allow
conservation and transfers to establish "reasonable" use In the
face of prior unreasonable use by the water rights holder, as was
the case in the Imperial Irrigation District-Metropolitan Water
District transfer. Further, by not requiring that potential buyers of
water first put all their existing water to beneficial use to the
fullest extent possible, nor prevent waste, unreasonable use, or
unreasonable method of use, there is no gurantee that transfers
will not exacerbate urban sprawl, groundwater overdraft, and
other unsustainable water management pro alems, Id. at 18.
74. Id.
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While'we believe that long-term. inter-regional,
voluntary transfers can help support communities
and economies, this will not occur without changes in
existing institutions. For efforts to create a water mar-
ket to succeed, especially in a demographically and
geographically diverse state like California, they must
facilitate greater community participation in water
policy in general and water transfers in particular.
Then, and only then, will we move closer to creating a
market for transfers that balances and protects the
interests of existing water nghts holders, potential
buyers, the environment, and communities.

